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Abstract 
Over the past half-century, there have been concerted efforts to standardize how clinicians and 
medical researchers refer to genetic material. However, practical and historical impediments 
thwart this goal. In the current paper I argue that the ontological status of a genetic mutation 
cannot be cleanly separated from its pragmatic role in therapy. Attempts at standardization fail 
due to the non-standardized ends to which genetic information is employed, along with historical 
inertia and unregulated local innovation. These factors prevent rationalistic attempts to 
‘modernize’ what is otherwise trumpeted as the most modern of the medical sciences. 
Keywords 
standardization, nomenclature, names and naming, classification, medical genetics 
Correspondence: 
Colin Michael Egenberger Halverson, Indiana University – Center for Bioethics, 410 W 10th St, 
Indianapolis, IN, 46202, USA 
Email: chalver@iu.edu 
____________________________________________________
This is the author's manuscript of the article published in final edited form as: 
Halverson, C. M. E. (2019). Standards and legacies: Pragmatic constraints on a uniform gene nomenclature. 
Social Studies of Science, 49(3), 432–455. https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312719850335
  2 
Introduction 
It was a beautiful summer afternoon in 2014, and I was indoors, observing a case conference in 
the Department of Medical Genetics at a Midwestern academic medical center. A young 
physician, whom I will call Dr. Novak, was presenting the case of a child with an undiagnosed 
rare disease. I will call the child Martin. Dr. Novak – who had not previously presented at one of 
these case conferences – appeared nervous as she stood in front of a table of other physicians, 
genetic counselors, nurses, and medical ethicists, who were gathered as a sort of expert panel in 
order to weigh in on her case. She later told me she felt a bit anxious talking in front of what she 
viewed as a very prestigious audience. The team of clinicians, on the other hand, was in good 
spirits, having spent much of the first five minutes of the conference joking about local politics 
before eventually transitioning to a more formal temper for Dr. Novak’s presentation. 
Discussions of patients’ cases in the weekly conference were highly generic, progressing 
from the basic biographic characteristics of the patients, to their clinical history, the results of 
their genetic testing, and finally those results’ potential interpretation and implications for 
healthcare. While she recounted the history of Martin’s case, Dr. Novak clicked through 
PowerPoint slides projected on a screen at the front of the room. As often happens with rare 
disease patients, Martin had been seen in Medical Genetics since his birth. His parents struggled 
to understand what was causing his seemingly random inflammations and fevers, and he had 
already undergone several genetic tests in pursuit of a diagnosis. As Dr. Novak built the evidence 
for the case, keeping her final conclusions at a tantalizing remove, anticipation and intrigue grew 
palpable in the room. True to the genre, she paused after exhibiting the result of the test: a single 
mutation found in a gene called CIAS1.  
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With suspense at its peak, Dr. Novak finally turned to her interpretation of the case: 
Mutations in CIAS1, she explained to the room, have been linked to inflammatory syndromes; 
therefore, she and her clinical team had received the laboratory result with excitement. This 
mutation was indeed the cause of Martin’s distress, they believed. However, upon further 
reflection, Dr. Novak was forced to conclude that this mutation could not be responsible for the 
patient’s symptoms: ‘It looked promising at first’, she said, but the medical conditions associated 
with the mutation as presented in the scientific literature were simply not severe enough to 
explain the patient’s acute health problems. That is why, she explained, she chose to bring 
Martin’s case to this particular body of genetics experts. Perhaps they could suggest other paths 
for her to take in her continued pursuit of a diagnosis for her patient. 
After some further discussion of Martin’s phenotype and the health of his parents, a 
pathologist spoke up. ‘Have you tested the NLRP3 gene?’ This gene, the pathologist emphasized, 
could be a prime suspect for mutations causing the specific symptoms expressed by the patient. 
No, Dr. Novak said as she enthusiastically wrote NLRP3 on the yellow legal pad in front of her. 
What laboratory test – she asked, looking up from her notes – might she order that would 
sequence this particular gene?  
The pathologist began to search a list of available tests on her laptop when she was 
interrupted by a genetic counselor who was also working on Martin’s case. ‘Wait, yes, we have 
already tested NLRP3. NLRP3 is the gene formerly known as CIAS1. I’m not really sure why it 
got renamed, … but the official gene name is NLRP3.’  
The senior pathologist balked for a moment before conceding. She was surprised that she 
had forgotten the old term. Dr. Novak, still the incumbent novice, apologized. She admitted that 
she had been unaware of the name change, and repeated that she was used to calling the gene 
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CIAS1, the name she had learned during her medical training. It would have been burdensome 
and negligent to order a repetition of the same test, she admitted, which at the time could have 
cost up to $3,000 and would have returned the same negative result. 
In place of the CIAS1/NLRP3 test, a medical geneticist who specialized in rheumatic 
diseases suggested another possible test. There was, however, noticeably less enthusiasm for this 
suggestion, as it also seemed only weakly to address the severity of the patient’s distress. In the 
end, the attendees of the case conference determined that the best option for a diagnosis would 
be to bring the patient into the Department of Medical Genetics, where a specialist would 
conduct a physical examination and collect a detailed family history in order to better understand 
what the condition underlying Martin’s debilitating symptoms could be. 
 
Renaming CIAS1  
The gene under discussion in the vignette above has a complicated history. It was first linked to 
inflammation around the turn of the millennium, as a part of a study on a so-called ‘allergy to 
cold’, a disorder that had been suspected since at least the late 1970s to have a genetic 
component (Wanderer, 1979). For this reason, scientists named the newly discovered gene 
CIAS1, an abbreviation of ‘cold-induced autoinflammatory syndrome’. It is common for gene 
names to reflect a corresponding phenotype or clinical presentation. In fact, the Human Genome 
Organisation recommends that the name of newly discovered genes describe what they encode 
(Wain et al., 1999). 
The ambiguity in this gene’s name emerged in 2008 (Ting et al., 2008). However, a 
preference for the designation NLRP3 eventually caused CIAS1 to shrink from its prominent 
place in the literature.0F1 This preference was based on a general trend away from identifying the 
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gene (solely) with this rare syndrome and toward identifying it with a broader range of 
associated disorders, some of which are not characterized by an ‘allergy to cold’ or even by 
inflammation at all (Nakanishi et al., 2017). A colleague of mine recently published an article 
calling for the renaming of another gene for the same reason, and he characterized this article as 
an attempt to improve the nomenclature’s ‘accuracy’. As did the CIAS1 reformers, he saw the 
divergence of linguistic and conceptual objects to be iconic of a rankling ‘irrational[ity]’ in 
medical genetics. The renaming of the CIAS1 gene was also meant to reflect the gene family – a 
gene family or superfamily is a set of genes that share similarities, generally in terms of their 
structure or function – of which it is now considered to be a part. Its new designation was 
decided through a consensus process, including the submission by email of votes from ‘over 100 
scientists’, held under the auspices of the Human Genome Organisation (Ting et al., 2008: 285).  
As is demonstrated in the opening vignette, however, old names – called ‘legacy’ names 
in medical genetics – have not ceased to be employed in informal conversation. Because of 
differences between Dr. Novak’s and the pathologist’s medical training and in their current 
engagements in independent speech communities, their norms and awareness of naming 
practices likewise differ. While this variation causes communicative friction between the two 
individuals, the fact of legacy nomenclature is well established in the metapragmatic awareness 
of clinicians in medical genetics. Many of my clinician interlocutors express overt frustration 
over the many different names for a single gene that circulate at any given time (see Halverson, 
in press). Major online databases list ‘synonyms’ of gene names, and in scientific publications, 
legacy and standard names may be used simultaneously or even interchangeably. For instance, 
Insalaco et al. (2014) refer to the gene from the vignette as ‘CIAS1/NLRP3’ in their article’s title, 
but in the body of the article they write equally of ‘the NLRP3 gene’ and ‘the CIAS1 gene,’ 
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seemingly varying freely between the standard and legacy alternants. Nonetheless, these names 
technically differ in how they group the gene and what attributes they ascribe to it. Moreover, 
‘many geneticists and molecular diagnosticians are probably unaware that [such colloquial 
names] are nonstandard’ in the first place (Ogino et al., 2007: 1). 
 Nomenclature systems in medical genetics demonstrate that the ability of gene names to 
refer to a specific entity cannot be cleanly divorced from their ability to describe and classify. 
This multifunctionality, I contend, is a fundamental feature of naming in general. By considering 
the conflicted history of gene nomenclatures and their thwarted attempts at uniformization and 
standardization, I argue that gene names are tethered to the evolving conceptualization and 
utilization of the molecular structures to which they refer. As scientists’ and clinicians’ 
understanding of both individual genes and their relationship to the entire genome has changed, 
so too have their names and their referential potential. This has coupled with increases in the 
granularity with which genes are scrutinized, an issue to which I return below. 
In examining these transformations, I build on previous work that has considered the 
multiple definitions of ‘the Gene.’ Using this capitalized orthography, I refer to the abstract 
concept of an epistemologically and practically uniform type of object, the emblem or epitome of 
the class of all individual genes. Some scholars have described interaction and conflict in 
conceptualizing ‘the Gene’ as due to clinical versus molecular perspectives (Fujimura, 1997; 
Kay, 2000; Keller, 2000), while others have seen it in terms of popular versus scientific 
perspectives (Hubbard and Wald, 1993; Nelkin and Lindee, 1995). Each of these scholars shows 
that ‘the Gene’ holds significantly different social value for different groups of people, and that 
these different conceptualizations frustrate and condition their exchange of ideas. I similarly 
problematize the dichotomy between the social and scientific character of ‘the Gene’. However, 
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the present article’s focus is specifically on the features of ‘the Gene’ that are selected as salient 
to various subfield’s local practices of classification. An examination of these different subfields 
reveals a fundamental disunity in medical genetics, mirroring the disunities described in other 
scientific fields (e.g. Berg and Mol, 1998; Dupré, 1983; Galison and Stump, 1996; Knorr Cetina, 
1999). However, rather than argue that these communities differ in what counts as a gene, I 
demonstrate that conflicts arise in terms of various genes’ pragmatic value for the relevant 
parties. The systematization of genes takes place based on their clinical relevance, driving an 
articulation of medically agnostic molecular objects with local conventions for determining 
pathogenicity. Genes are ‘truly biomedical entities’ in Keating and Cambrosio’s (2003: 331) 
formulation. In my analysis, the concept of ‘the Gene’ fails to be standardized because of 
disagreements over which of its features are salient to expert practice, and thus to its 
classification. 
This article also works to contribute to the body of anthropological work on naming (e.g. 
Bodenhorn and vom Bruck, 2006) and standardization (discussed in more detail below) by 
investigating a set of scientific nomenclatures that has remained outside social science’s 
investigative gaze. That said, parallel work exists describing the transformation of naming 
practices in other clinical domains, such as the effects on disease categorization of market forces 
(Moynihan, 2002; Payer, 1992), of popular and non-expert representations (Brown, 1995; Hogan, 
2016; Kleinman, 1988), and of technological developments (Blaxter, 1978; Jutel, 2009; Keating 
and Cambrosio, 2000; Kendell, 1975; Navon, 2011; Rabeharisoa and Bourret, 2009). These 
scholars have shown that the linguistic categories of disease names are tethered to – and thus 
transform alongside – a variety of extra-linguistic forces. I draw on these literatures to argue that 
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the divergent and evolving social values of ‘the Gene’ for various biomedical subfields thwart 
linguistic attempts to standardize its nomenclature. 
The current project arose from ethnographic questions that are central to my ongoing 
fieldwork in medical genetics clinics. However, because of my interest in nomenclature, this 
article has also come to draw additionally on an extensive engagement with primary sources 
produced by official and aspirant nomenclature committees. In order to explain the divergent 
social value of gene names, I turn to three separate case studies of actual attempts to standardize 
nomenclature systems. Each case demonstrates the effects of historical inertia and specialization 
on standardization in different ways. I conclude with a discussion of major themes from across 
each of these case studies and argue that a fundamental disunity in the social value of genes 
prevents their unification under the auspices of a general nomenclature of ‘the Gene’. 
 
Legacy nomenclatures 
The gene described in the opening vignette, CIAS1, is hardly unique in its having been renamed. 
Many genes have similarly complicated histories and naming conventions. Schijvenaars and 
colleagues suggest that ‘up to one third of human genes’ have more than one name found in the 
published scientific literature (Schijvenaars et al., 2005: 149). Moreover, some of the same terms 
have referred to more than one gene. For instance, ‘PAP’ has stood as a name for as many five 
unrelated human genes. These issues of renaming, homonymy, and synonymy cause 
consternations within medical genetics, a field that brings together ‘bioclinical collectives’ 
(Bourret, 2005; Rabeharisoa and Bourret, 2009) – researchers and clinicians from multiple 
professional generations, united in collaborative research and clinical care.  
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 Active proponents of nomenclature standardization have been campaigning for 
uniformity for decades. ‘One human genome – one language’, declares one such manifesto 
(Shows et al., 1987: 12), imploring members of subfields to acknowledge a single, unified 
nomenclature. Heterogeneity in these systems has been derided as categorically irrational, with 
announcements of ‘a genetic and molecular basis for a single human gene language without 
dialects’ (Shows et al., 1987). Standardization is in part driven by an ideological insistence that 
names be singular and coherent because nature itself is singular and coherent, an insistence that 
‘signs at last correspond to causes, without obstacle, without evasion, without contradiction’ 
(Barthes, 1972: 25). Researchers see standardization as a way to rationalize the nomenclature to 
reflect the science, to find the ‘coherence relations’ (Silverstein, 2006; see also Carruthers and 
Espeland, 1991) between its conceptual and linguistic objects.  
Moreover, many researchers consider a general standard to be necessary for the 
successful implementation of genetic science into medical care. ‘[I]t is essential that information 
about mutations and variations in the human genome [is] communicated easily and 
unequivocally’ (Ogino, 2007: 1). Without a general standard, many of its proponents worry, 
researchers in different communities will not be able to co-refer to unique genes, algorithms will 
not be able to comb large databases successfully, and clinicians will not be able reliably to derive 
classificatory information from test reports. 
However, heterogeneity is not something that can be readily overcome. In what follows, I 
argue that the aspirations of medical genetics to a uniform nomenclature of ‘the Gene’ are 
frustrated by the disunity of clinical practice coupled with an historical inertia entailed in the 
process of training in medical genetics. I build on the extensive social scientific literature on 
standardization (e.g., Bowker and Star, 1999; Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000; Epstein, 2007; Gal, 
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2006; Inoue, 2006; Silverstein, 1996; Star and Lampland, 2009; Timmermans and Epstein, 2010) 
and demonstrate that the implementation of standards can prove troubled – if not fundamentally 
impossible – under certain social circumstances.  
Below, I discuss how medical subfields’ unique practical needs affect naming systems, 
but first I turn to the issue of historical inertia. The problem of legacy nomenclatures arises for 
two primary reasons: The first is that multiple laboratories may investigate the same gene or 
hereditary disorder at the same time, naming their shared discoveries separately and more or less 
simultaneously. These names then circulate side by side in spoken language and scientific 
literature. The second reason is that researchers aggregate gene families and rename genetic 
material as they learn more about genes’ relationship to the proteins they encode and the diseases 
to which they contribute, in order to reflect this new classificatory information. 
 
Historical heterogeneity 
There are currently at least six distinct nomenclature systems in general use in medical genetics 
and many more systems in use by specialists in subfields (Schoenbill et al., 2014). In this article I 
focus on one particular system with its own internal heterogeneity, a system of nomenclature 
called gene and allele symbols. This is the most common way scientists and clinicians name 
genes in the Department of Medical Genetics, and it includes designations such as CIAS1 and 
other, more common names like APOE, BRCA, and HOX.1F2 Gene names (called ‘symbols’ by 
researchers in the profession) are standardly written in italics in order to distinguish them from 
the proteins they produce, which – mutatis mutandis – often share the same abbreviations. For 
instance, the EGFR gene (mutations in which have been linked to a variety of cancers) encodes 
the protein EGFR. 
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As mentioned above, these ‘symbols’ have both a descriptive quality – representing the 
molecular products or the diseases associated with the gene – and a classificatory quality –
 grouping genetic material into families and superfamilies based on intragroup similarities in 
structure and function. In this way, symbols represent a classic system of naming (Bodenhorn 
and vom Bruck, 2006). However, neither of these qualities has been removed from the rapid 
conceptual transformations characteristic of medical genetics: Numerous genes have been shown 
to affect many different states of health and disease, and the state most salient to medical care is 
not always the first discovered – and thus neither the one for which a gene is named. In some 
instances, the original interpretation of the gene has even changed. For instance, the SERPIN 
gene family received its symbol because it was first thought to encode serine proteinase 
inhibitors. However, scientists now believe that many of the genes in the family do not act to 
inhibit gene expression at all, but rather serve in cell storage and transport. Furthermore, gene 
symbols reflect existing classificatory groups, but they also necessarily face pressure to change 
as the classification system changes around them. This is precisely what happened in the case of 
CIAS1/NLRP3 described above. 
These difficulties were already apparent to scientists early in the history of genetics 
research, and by the 1960s standardization had been recommended as a means to resolve them 
(Povey et al., 2001). In 1977, at the Fourth International Workshop on Human Gene Mapping in 
Winnipeg, specialists from around the globe sent in nominations by post, and a committee of 
geneticists was established to oversee the naming of all human genes.2F3 The committee served as 
an institution of ‘regulatory objectivity’ (Cambrosio et al., 2006), constituting the objects of its 
oversight through the collective generation and proliferation of naming conventions. Through the 
consensus of the experts, they attempted to create an international standard out of the disunity of 
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existing local systems. Two years later, the committee published its first guidelines for unique 
and meaningful gene symbols (Shows et al., 1979). The committee has since circulated updates 
to these guidelines every few years. 
The Human Genome Organisation’s Gene Nomenclature Committee (HGNC) acts as one 
gatekeeper for ratifying official gene symbols. It oversees many subordinate nomenclature 
committees for individual gene families. In some cases, though, other organizations officiate the 
baptism of symbols within their specific subsystems. For example, the World Health 
Organization manages the naming of certain genes related to autoimmunity (the subject of 
Section 1.2), and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention oversees the workgroup 
regulating the nomenclature of genes that affect drug metabolism (the subject of Section 2.2).  
However, the true force of standardization comes from the gatekeeping and circulatory 
mechanisms of journals, online databases, and regulatory agencies like the FDA, which control 
both the funding and the publication of genetics research and thus the proliferation (and 
extinction) of specific linguistic systems. Many major publications require that authors use 
‘standard compliant’ nomenclatures in their articles. These institutions are in a symbiotic 
relationship with the nomenclature committees in their joint aspirations to linguistic hegemony. 
The circulation of gene names lives and dies by their uptake in major journals. The Human 
Genome Organisation boasts that its standard is ‘used in all the major secondary databases’ and 
in ‘most journals primarily concerned with human genetics’ (Povey, 2002: 1). Other 
nomenclature committees petition journals and large, gatekeeping organizations to accept their 
recommendations and heed their particular concerns. For instance, researchers working on a 
naming system for one specific group of genes state at the end of their recommendations, ‘[w]e 
hope that this simplified and unified nomenclature will be useful to the [subfield] in general and 
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adopted by all our colleagues. The nomenclature described herein will be used in all publications 
by the authors of this manuscript’ (Nebert et al., 1987: 10).  
Once a name is in circulation, though, it is hard to eradicate it from. As demonstrated in 
the opening vignette, a legacy name might never be fully excised from (even expert) discourse. 
As Blaxter notes regarding diagnostic categories, gene names exist and compete within ‘a 
museum of past and present concepts of the nature of disease’ (Blaxter, 1978: 10; see also 
Kendell, 1975; Rabeharisoa and Bourett, 2009). 
 
Naming as description and classification 
The linguistic terrain of medical genetics is simultaneously propelled by the centripetal force of 
standardization and the centrifugal force of specialization. Nomenclature committees for 
numerous genes and gene families have formed in order to standardize locally heterogeneous 
naming practices. Several superordinate committees have also come together to unify these 
standards across subfields and create a nomenclature for ‘the Gene’ as a generalized model. As 
noted above, the lack of naming standards is typically seen as irrational, as preventing the 
successful utilization of genetic information being translated into clinical care. However, the 
individual research teams exploring these different gene systems come with their own unique 
goals for the implementation of their discoveries. Moreover, different genes have radically 
unrelated implications for human health and medical care. Therefore, as gene names work 
simultaneously to describe and classify their referents, the question becomes: What information 
do researchers see as essential to convey with their various nomenclature systems? These 
differences may ultimately prove irreconcilable within the social system of medical genetics, and 
the failure of the numerous attempts at standardization has resulted not merely from historical 
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inertia but equally from the fundamental disunity of subfield conceptualizations of ‘the Gene’ as 
a clinically meaningful object (cf. Fujimura, 1997; Kay, 2000; Keller, 2000). What constitutes 
the essence of a given gene cannot be fully disarticulated from what constitutes its social value 
for the practice of medical genetics. 
How, then, do researchers come to conclusions about what is essential about a gene? In 
the 1987 ‘Guidelines for human gene nomenclature’, the authors caution that gene symbols 
‘should not attempt to indicate all known information about a gene’ (Shows et al., 1987: 12). The 
amount of information produced in a genetic test can be enormous. Even the information about 
the sequence itself is too complex to distill it into a single symbol, let alone for that symbol 
additionally to convey how that genetic information corresponds to a particular disease state 
(Halverson, in press). As with all forms of classification, the question of naming as a descriptive 
act is thus necessarily a question of triage (Timmermans et al., 1998). 
In certain instances, the only descriptive information that clinicians need from a gene 
symbol is the gene family itself. Hearing that a mutation has been found in either of the two 
BRCA genes (which are famously linked to breast cancer, among other things) leads clinicians 
down a very specific path: Certain medical interventions can be recommended regardless of 
which gene is affected, or how it is specifically affected. ‘She has a BRCA mutation’ is a 
common and meaningful statement within the Department of Oncology. Some cases require 
many more (and different) details. For example, knowing that a patient has a mutation in the 
CYP gene superfamily (discussed below) could lead clinicians in a radically divergent array of 
directions, depending on whether that mutation causes the patient to metabolize a given drug 
more quickly or more slowly. The utterance ‘#He has a CYP mutation’ would be so vague as to 
be functionally meaningless and would fail Grice’s maxims with regard to the quantity, 
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relevance and perspicuity of the information it provides (Grice, 1975). That is, it would fail to be 
a meaningful contribution to an ongoing conversation if the speaker had intended to be 
cooperative. 
This tension drives a sort of Borgesian map–territory conundrum (Borges, 1998), where 
the world of representation threatens to collapse indistinguishably into the world being 
represented. Borges describes the map of an empire that – for the sake of capturing every minute 
detail – is the same size as the empire itself – and is, therefore, also completely useless as a form 
of representation. The primary way geneticists deal with this conundrum is to ‘constrain a 
phenomenon within a particular set of dimensions’ (Star and Lampland, 2009: 14) by classifying 
it within a standardized group. In order to prevent an ‘N=∞’ style reductio, in which every gene 
is treated as irreducibly unique, genes and their variations are organized into categories. The 
categories themselves are given names, each with sufficient descriptive granularity so as to prove 
meaningful within the context of medical genetics practice. That is, the gene’s framework of 
meaningfulness within the social economy of this international project determines what features 
are selected for representation in standard nomenclatures and what other features are disregarded. 
Gene names are therefore meant to reduce all the available data about a gene to only 
those most socially salient features. Some nomenclature systems explicitly reject monoglot 
standardization (Silverstein, 1996), meaning that they refuse to impose uniform mandates; 
instead, they promote local ‘preferences’ and methods for ‘compliance’. They thereby allow for 
variation in name structure in order to accommodate the different clinical and scientific ends to 
which nomenclatures can be employed.  
Certain genes and gene families have such radical particularity in terms of their structure 
and function that nomenclature committees of specialists have been formed to capture their 
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unique aspects in ways that escape the rationalizing univocality of general standards. As Star and 
Lampland note, a problem with general standards is that ‘one person’s well-fitting standard may 
be another’s impossible nightmare’ (Star and Lampland, 2009: 5). Drawing on the work of 
Epstein (2007, 2009), I label these local forms niche standards. Insular subfield committees 
create ‘distinct standards, each appropriate to a subgroup’ (Epstein, 2009: 50; see also Star and 
Lampland, 2009 on the nesting of standards) of genetic material. While the committees may 
ultimately turn to a larger body – such as the Human Genome Organisation – for validation and 
entry into broad and normative circulation, niche standards create their own systematics that are 
based on local values and are distinct from those of other nomenclatures. 
 
HLA nomenclature: Vestigial legacies and the Borgesian map 
For instance, consider the historical case of HLA nomenclature. HLA is a gene family important 
to human health because it encodes human leucocyte antigens (hence the gene family’s symbol), 
which are molecules that help to regulate the immune system. The specific form of these genes 
varies greatly between individuals. In fact, they are ‘amongst the most polymorphic in the human 
genome’, with some 16,000 documented variations (Zheng et al., 2017). This amount of 
idiosyncratic variability is so great that they are called ‘hyper-polymorphic’ in the scientific 
literature. Being able to name the genes accurately is necessary for the successful matching of 
donors and recipients for cord blood and bone marrow transplantation (called histocompatibility). 
Thus, discriminating between individual forms of HLA holds significant social value for a major 
sector of modern biomedicine.  
In 1964, two separate laboratories discovered the HLA gene family independently of each 
other. Each research team gave the family a name: HU-1 and LA. It took three years and as many 
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international conferences to arrive at a compromise between these rival names, merging them 
into one standard symbol, as HL-A (Wain et al., 1999: 162). However, much work remained to 
be done. HL-A was merely the ‘root symbol’ for an entire family of genes – all of which are 
located within a specific region of chromosome 6, and all of which play similar roles in 
autoimmunity. Various laboratories had already begun assigning idiosyncratic names to 
individual genes within the family. Therefore, at the time of the Third Conference on 
Histocompatibility Testing, specialists elected a Nomenclature Committee that was tasked with 
overseeing the standardization of the names of these individual genes. On the committee were 
geneticists, hematologists, transplantation specialists, and immunologists from across Europe and 
North America. 
In 1968, the Committee – under the auspices of the World Health Organization – 
published the first standardized nomenclature of the HL-A genes. The Committee had determined 
to select names for its standard based on their ‘most common use, without regard to priorities or 
supposed genetic relationships’ (WHO Nomenclature Committee 1968: 438). They did, however, 
standardize the form of these symbols. This produced names of the sort HL-A3 in place of the old 
‘dialectal’ variation between To-10, LA3, and Lc-3, among others. 
The following year, further standardization took place: The niche HLA nomenclature 
system was incorporated into the general guidelines for all gene names, regardless of gene family 
(Shows et al., 1979: 108). The new HLA symbols were of the sort HLAB7. The system now more 
or less followed the major nomenclature conventions for ‘the Gene’. This new, general standard 
removed the hyphen (though this convention later reemerged).3F4 The root HLA was appended first 
with a letter, referring to the gene’s individual locus within the chromosomal region, and then – 
after the asterisk – with a number, referring to the specific type of blood serum it encodes. 
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However, this standardization did not make the information that was encoded in the system 
uniform with that encoded by other subsystems. That is, the niche standard accounted for blood 
serum categories that the general standard did not. 
In order to update the nomenclature to reflect changing interpretations of the HLA system 
and its relationship to human health, the Committee continued to meet every few years. Since 
that time, however, new concerns have arisen. For instance, as technology for sequencing genes 
has improved, it has become increasingly clear that genes vary not in discrete subfamilies but 
rather along a ‘continuum’ of diversity (Marsh et al., 2010: 294), what Fujimura and colleagues 
might call ‘clines without classes’ (Fujimura et al., 2014). This limits the descriptive 
meaningfulness of HLA symbols, as no symbol can capture enough specificity to discriminate 
between all the various permutations of nucleotide sequences within the gene family.  
It had been announced in 1967 that ‘15 or more’ categories of genetic variation might 
account for differences in certain types of autoimmune functions (Bach and Amos, 1967: 1506). 
Between 2005 and 2010 alone, though, more than 2500 new variations within the HLA system 
were given official symbols (Marsh et al., 2010: 294), and by 2015 over twenty distinct HLA 
genes had been described and named. Hence, the map–territory conundrum complicates the act 
of standardization: If variation is continuous, how can researchers manage to describe and 
classify it in a parsimonious manner? 
By 2017, variation within the system came to be ascribed symbols such as HLA-
DRB1*30:20:12, with a granularity of representation characteristic of a more baroque age of 
genetic science and technology. Although symbols are now allowed to have as many as eight 
digits following the gene root, the capacity to describe regular variation within certain genes is 
nonetheless ‘fast approaching the maximum possible for the current naming convention’ (Marsh 
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et al., 2010). Thus, there is a final limit set by present standards as to how much description can 
actually be embedded in a single symbol. In order to accommodate this limitation, the 
Nomenclature Committee has asserted that only empirically demonstrated variation should be 
given a name. As the researchers in charge of the online Immuno Polymorphism Database state, 
the system must not become ‘a dataset of [all] theoretical combinations’ of variation (Robinson 
et al., 2015: D423), but rather must limit itself to only those variants discovered within existing 
individuals. 
We have now seen many of the concerns and features characteristic of this history of 
gene nomenclatures. As the science evolves, alternate systems emerge and decay. New science 
often pushes out old names, but vestigial ‘legacies’ can persist even – as in the case with SERPIN 
mentioned above – when their descriptive faculty contradicts current understandings of genetic 
meaningfulness. The case of HLA provides particular insight. While it began in a state of 
nomenclatural heterogeneity,4F5 the push for standardization has managed to produce a set of 
names recognizable as gene symbols, which are uniform on their surface with symbols from 
other niche standards. There is historical inertia as well, though, in the form of symbols 
organized by a logic of coherence relations unique to the clinical meaningfulness of the specific 
molecules that the genes encode. We have also seen a centrifugal force of specialized description 
that has proliferated the digits after the HLA gene root in order to represent the unique forms of 
‘hyper-polymorphic’ diversity specific to that gene family. All the while, this force is 
counteracted by the limits of the (albeit lax) general standards that the nomenclature is now 
required to fit. Thus, while HLA nomenclature has conceded to assimilate certain structural 
features of the general nomenclature system, it has nonetheless been constructed to represent the 
specific social value it holds for the medical subfields most intimately concerned with it.  
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Contemporary diversity 
Certain gene families hold idiosyncratic – perhaps irreducibly idiosyncratic – social value for 
healthcare. As I have begun to suggest above, the utility of knowing any genetic information in 
the Department of Medical Genetics is judged based on its ability to inform a patient’s care. 
Among research scientists, the interest is broader but is still generally limited by its relationship 
to a given disease state (see, e.g., Halverson, in press). That is, what constitutes the meaningful 
essence of a gene cannot be fully disengaged from what constitutes its pragmatic value for 
healthcare.  
In the following section, I explain how the disunity of the scientific and clinical 
meaningfulness of genetic variation acts as a key driver of linguistic heterogeneity. This 
heterogeneity persists in the face of ongoing attempts to rationalize the numerous gene 
nomenclature systems under a single, general standard. The following two cases of gene family 
subsystems demonstrate the selection of different features of genetic sequence information in the 
constitution of nomenclatures as classificatory systems.  
 
The case of KIR: Distinctive descriptions 
Some systems resist otherwise generalizing attempts at uniform standards. The method for 
naming KIR genes is one such system. KIR genes encode killer-cell immunoglobulin-like 
receptors.5F6 As with HLA genes, KIR genes are intimately involved in the body’s self-defense and 
self-recognition.6F7 The genes are important for the function of natural killer (NK) cells – immune 
cells that deliver toxins to kill virus-infected and tumor cells. Specifically, KIR genes encode 
receptor molecules that NK cells use to recognize the chemical signature of cells that belong to 
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the ‘self’ (and therefore should not be killed) versus those that are damaged or are ‘non-self’ (and 
thus need to be killed). 
 Again like HLA genes, KIR genes are highly idiosyncratic in their genetic sequences. 
This is evolutionarily significant, because it allows for distinctive chemical signals to emerge 
within individuals. These signals are specific to those individuals and thus allow their immune 
system to discriminate between a variety of substances, including benign substances that 
constitute parts of the individuals’ bodies themselves. In fact, their idiosyncrasy is so great that 
NK cells have ‘an unprecedented phenotypic and functional diversity within and between 
individuals’ (Rajalingam, 2012: 391).  
 Unlike HLA, however, the KIR gene family was much later to the game in terms of 
nomenclature standardization. The genes did not receive their own nomenclature committee until 
2002, under the auspices of the superordinate Human Genome Organisation’s (HUGO) Genome 
Nomenclature Committee. At the time of its foundation, the KIR committee only needed to 
oversee standardization for 17 genes, but by 2014 more than 600 genes had been described, 
coding for more than 320 unique KIR protein sequences. Since then, the job of the committee 
has only continued to grow in scope and complexity. 
In the committee’s initial report in 2002, it was decided that the KIR genes would receive 
symbols that reflected ‘the structures of the molecules they encode’ (Marsh, 2003: 80). For an 
illustration of these structures, see Figure 1. An example of KIR notation is KIR2DL5A.7F8 
The notation for the KIR gene family obligatorily encodes information about the protein it 
produces as well as information about the gene itself. The name KIR2DL5A notes the gene 
family with the root symbol KIR. This is followed by a numeral (either 2 or 3) denoting the 
number of ‘immunoglobulin-like domains’ present in the KIR receptor. (This is followed by the 
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obligatory letter D for domain.) These ‘domains’ stand outside the NK cell itself and allow the 
killer cell to bind to other cells – both ‘self’ and ‘non-self.’ Knowing the number and form of 
these domains is significant because it determines what type of cells a particular receptor can and 
cannot detect.  
[FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
Next, the gene symbol contains either the letter S, L, or P. An S means that the receptor encoded 
by the gene has a short tail anchoring it in the cytoplasm of the NK cell; an L means it has a long 
tail; and a P means that the receptor is encoded by a ‘pseudogene,’ or an imperfect copy of an 
otherwise functional gene. Receptors with short tails form bonds with cells that they recognize as 
‘non-self,’ thus triggering the NK cell to release toxins that destroy these foreign bodies. 
Receptors with long tails, on the other hand, form bonds with cells chemically marked as ‘self,’ 
which inhibit the ‘natural killer’ function of their hosts.  
The KIR symbol concludes with a final digit. This represents the unique number of the 
individual gene encoding the receptor within the broader family of genes. As mentioned above, 
there were originally only 17 recognized KIR genes, but now there are hundreds reported in the 
literature. These genes are spread out across the various subfamilies, which are denoted by the 
preceding two segments of the gene symbol, and only the very last morphological segment of the 
symbol describes the unique, individual gene.  
Thus, KIR symbols obligatorily encode the strikingly distinctive – and clinically salient –
 features of the molecules that the genes produce. The nomenclature describes its referents with 
enough granularity to demonstrate what makes individual genes ‘functionally distinct’ from one 
another (Rajalingam, 2012: 393). Unlike the BRCA genes, where the clinically salient 
information is conveyed by the symbol’s root, much more information is relevant for researchers 
discussing KIR genes. While the KIR nomenclature committee operates under (and thus within) 
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the bounds of the general standards set down by the Human Genome Organisation, the 
characteristics selected for representation in the symbol directly reflect the gene’s unique 
relevance to human health and disease. In this way, KIR nomenclature is a clear instance of niche 
standardization, in which the universalizing aspirations of naming ‘the Gene’ are constrained by 
the idiosyncrasies of the specific gene family itself. 
 
The case of star alleles: Non-standard values 
Another example of a gene system that has highly unique properties and whose variation has 
major medical significance is the superfamily of pharmacogenetic genes. They are so called 
because they affect a patient’s response to different pharmaceuticals. Individual variation in 
these genes can determine whether a certain drug has a positive or negative effect on a patient, 
and whether that patient needs a lower or a higher dosage than is standardly prescribed. There 
are likely over 1000 human genes that condition drug response (Kalman et al., 2016), and even 
just the single gene CYP2D6 is involved in the metabolism of more than seventy commonly 
prescribed drugs (Nebert and Jorge-Nebert, 2002). A particular variant of the CYP2D6 gene 
(called *5) causes adverse reactions to many of these drugs, whereas another variant (*1X13) 
causes the body to metabolize them so quickly that the patient derives no therapeutic benefit 
from the standard prescription. Variation within this gene can have more than a 20-fold effect on 
what amount constitutes an appropriate drug dosage for an individual patient (Ingelman-
Sundberg, 2002). 
The efficacy of at least 150 FDA-approved drugs is conditioned by pharmacogenetic 
variation (Eichelbaum et al., 2006). Knowledge of a patient’s genetic sequence in these genes 
can therefore provide very salient – even essential – information for the prescription of many 
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medications. Until this point, I have only discussed nomenclature at the level of the gene or gene 
family. However, in the case of pharmacogenetic variation, particularly meaningful is what is 
found below the level of the gene, in the idiosyncratic variation within the genes themselves. 
Genes can be quite large – with thousands, sometimes even millions of nucleotides constituting a 
single gene’s sequence – and mutations can occur at many different loci within these sequences. 
Such difference between individual tokens of an abstract genotype is called allelic variation, and 
it is the focus of many attempts at standardizing pharmacogenetic nomenclatures. 
[FIGURE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 Efforts to produce standard naming systems at the scale of the gene can be traced back to 
the 1960s. However, the technological means of visualizing genes with the granularity needed to 
classify them based on their molecular sequence was not feasible at that time. It was not until 
decades later – in the early 1990s – that geneticists at Baylor College of Medicine began 
publishing well-attended suggestions for a standardized means of notating mutations within 
genes (e.g., Beaudet and Tsui, 1993). In fact, as the Human Genome Project neared completion, 
scientists began publicly expressing their surprise at the ‘tremendous degree’ of the allelic 
heterogeneity of individual genes, which was only then becoming visible through new 
developments in sequencing methods – but which was arriving on researchers’ computers in the 
form of ‘a staggering “information overload”’ (Nebert, 2000: 279). By that point, there were 
already numerous independent research groups working on different genes, and many of these 
groups had developed their own niche methods for naming variation below the level of the gene. 
This meant that allelic variation had been named ‘in a fairly random fashion’, which researchers 
complained was leading to a ‘chaotic situation’ in the global scheme of pharmacogenetic 
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nomenclatures (Garte, 2001: 1305). Standardization was the obvious next step for many 
researchers who had been involved in similar efforts for other gene systems. 
 What emerged from the pursuit of standardization was a system my interlocutors in the 
Department of Medical Genetics call the ‘star allele’ system. The ‘star’ refers to the asterisk that 
the system uses to separate the gene symbol from the symbol representing allelic variation within 
the given gene. Star alleles, therefore, are names that allow scientists and clinicians to distinguish 
between medically meaningful variation within the broader system of pharmacogenetic genes. 
The use of the asterisk for this purpose was already in place in the first version of the 
international standard for gene nomenclatures (Shows et al., 1979), but when my interlocutors 
refer to ‘star alleles’ they are specifically talking about pharmacogenetic variants in genes 
associated with drug processing. That is, they are not talking about the difference between states 
of Tay Sachs disease (HEXA*2), gangliosidosis (HEXA*3), and statistically normal health 
(HEXA*1). None of these variants has anything to do with pharmacogenetics but they 
nonetheless all use the standard ‘star’ system for annotating allelic differences within a specific 
gene.  
 The historical heterogeneity of pharmacogenetic systems has certainly been a problem for 
attempts at standardization. Early researchers promoting the star allele system insisted that 
people ‘speak the same language’ and ‘avoid “home-made” allelic designations that would only 
confuse the nomenclature system and the scientific literature’ (Ingelman-Sundberg et al., 2001: 
1307). They touted the ‘universal acceptance and usage of one single system for all 
[pharmacogenetic] gene alleles’ as their ‘critically important goal’ (Garte, 2001: 1305). However, 
these attempts have been frustrated further by the specificity of the various genes’ idiosyncratic 
values for human health and disease. In fact, these values vary so greatly within the 
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pharmacogenetic system that the system has segmented into a number of relatively independent 
subsystems. Some of the different pharmacogenetic gene families have their own committees 
overseeing unique, niche naming conventions for their allelic variation. Some genes have no 
nomenclature committees at all, with allelic variation still being named without a standard for 
reference. Some subsystems are not actively updated to keep pace with developments in research 
and understanding, and others have numerous, competing nomenclatures that have not been 
unified under an agreed-upon standard (Kalman et al., 2016).  
The most prominent of the pharmacogenetic gene families are referred to in HGNC 
standard notation as the CYP genes, an abbreviation of cytochrome P450, the specific drug-
metabolizing enzyme that they encode. Like the HLA gene complex discussed above, the role of 
the CYP genes was discovered separately by three different laboratories (Robarge et al., 2007). 
In 1999, the complexity of the genes’ relationship to clinical therapy had already been 
recognized, and the Cytochrome P450 (CYP) Allele Nomenclature Committee was convened to 
create a standard that would reflect the medical relevance of variation in this specific subset of 
genes.  
We can take CYP2D6*3 as an example of star allele nomenclature as developed by the 
Nomenclature Committee. CYP2D6 is a particular gene in the larger CYP gene superfamily. The 
first numeral after the gene superfamily root (CYP) refers to a lower level of classification: CYP 
families 1 through 3 are involved in metabolizing foreign substances like drugs. Those with 
higher numeric designations are involved in metabolizing substances produced within the body. 
The following letter and number refer to the specific gene within that family. The asterisk – or 
‘star’ of the star alleles – separates the symbol for the gene as an abstract concept from the actual 
allelic variant of the gene that is found within a particular individual. The variant represented is 
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the third variant of the gene to be reported to cause a difference in the function of the CYP 
protein that the gene encodes. There has historically been conflict over how to number these 
variants. One method has simply been to increase the number each time the description of a new 
allele is published. Another method has been to number alleles based on their physical position 
within the gene. A third method has to been to require their numbering to correspond to the 
‘most severe consequences’ of the variant for a patient’s health (Sim and Ingelman-Sundberg, 
2010: 281). Under the star allele system, such waves of standardization attempts exist 
simultaneously as a sort of palimpsest, ‘resulting in the gene names … being out of sequence’ 
(Nelson, 2004: 2) when judged from different standards’ unique vantages. The star allele system 
leaves this ‘irrationality’ unresolved, as the accumulative result of historical inertia. The 
‘myriads of interlocking conventions’ (Cambrosio et al., 2006: 197) each get embedded within 
the single (arbitrary) standard. 
Thus, in the CYP genes – and in pharmacogenetic genes more generally – we see the 
same historical, descriptive, and classificational forces at work below the scale of the gene as 
well. Historically heterogeneous and niche systems continue to operate within different 
pharmacogenetic gene families and persist as legacies within otherwise uniform nomenclatures. 
The star allele system has not managed to rationalize the numbering system of CYP variation, a 
fact that underscores the competitive (rather than self-evident) nature of classification in 
determining what information is most salient to the taxonomic task (see also Dupré, 1999). Even 
within this particular gene superfamily – with its highly specific relationship to medical genetics 
– researchers debate whether to include in the name descriptive information about the variant’s 
relationship to an individual’s health (phenotypic data about drug metabolism) or its structure 
within the gene (genotypic data about its position). The object of such naming thus walks the line 
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between more traditional clinical entities and what Navon (2011) calls ‘genomic designation’, 
oscillating between its more distal and more proximal products. Researchers continue to debate 
which features of the genes to select as relevant for the pragmatic act of classification. 
Standardization has so far failed to create a fully uniform and rationalized system of 
nomenclature because of the heterogeneous social value such names hold for their various users. 
 
Discussion 
A number of related pragmatic issues have constrained the repeated efforts to create general 
standards for naming genes and genetic variation. I have argued that these efforts are 
fundamentally thwarted by the inseparability of the meaningful essence of ‘the Gene’ from 
individual genes’ pragmatic value for healthcare and scientific discovery. ‘The Gene’ as an 
object of contemporary clinical practice exists as the articulation of a medically agnostic 
molecular structure and local value systems used to determine pathogenicity. In fact, it 
instantiates these two ‘material and discursive arrangements’ (Keating and Cambrosio, 2003: 
332) as a thoroughly biomedical entity.  
Standardization further suffers under the material fact of the boundaries between the 
relevant speech communities and bioclinical collectives within medical genetics itself. Archaic 
forms – so-called legacy nomenclatures – that do not meet current general standards are still with 
some regularity heard in case conferences or seen in print, because their siloed users are not 
always aware of changes in guidelines and recommendations. Thus, new and old criteria of 
classification exist side by side in a sort of palimpsest (cf. Rabeharisoa and Bourret, 2009). Since 
nomenclature systems strive to convey scientifically accurate information, they evolve alongside 
current beliefs about the structure and function of human genetic material (cf. Hogan, 2016). For 
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clinicians who have been removed from the lockstep of research, modifying their own linguistic 
practices appropriately can prove challenging, as was seen in the opening vignette. 
 In accommodating this disunity, many official nomenclature guidelines explicitly allow 
for or even promote the supplementary use of non-standard forms. Some legacy forms are so 
common that they appear in written materials as parentheticals behind the contemporary, 
standard-compliant name. This atavism is due to the assumption that for some readers, the 
former will be familiar while the latter will be unrecognizable. For instance, Berwouts and 
colleagues have suggested in the official journal of the Human Genome Variation Society 
(HGVS) that ‘[r]eports should include a description of identified sequence variants in both 
HGVS and traditional nomenclature … [which] ensures legibility and compatibility with the 
existing literature’ (Berwouts et al., 2011: 3). In other instances, the standards themselves 
prevent the impulses behind them to rationalize the coherence relations within their own 
nomenclatures and instead elect archaic, non-systematized forms as official gene symbols. This 
was the case with the disorderly numbered HLA genes, which have been allowed to remain ‘out 
of sequence’ (Nelson 2004: 2), as vestiges within a contemporary niche standard. 
 Moreover, the success of standardization hinges on the uniformity of its object (Espeland 
and Stevens, 1998). If that uniformity does not already exist, it can be performatively constituted 
through standardization (e.g., Berg and Mol, 1998; Mol, 2002). However, as we have seen in the 
case of gene nomenclature, the process can be highly contested in this regard. Even in decidedly 
rationalistic systems such as those of medical genetics, the pragmatic disunity in the social value 
of genetic information leads to a disunity in the conceptualization of the abstract notion of ‘the 
Gene’ within medical genetics. While regulatory objectivity still functions within local niche 
nomenclature committees, it fails to establish general conventions at a broader scale. 
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Standardization ultimately fails to regiment the description of specific genes to parallel the 
spectrum of meaningfulness imputed to a universal model of ‘the Gene’. It proves unable to 
‘eliminate the pragmatic features that constitute … [their] distinctive character’ (Gal, 2006: 171) 
and social utility for their users. Nomenclatures do not simply carve nature at its joints, but 
neither do they allow a ‘Borgesian map’ to emerge. Only those aspects of genetic material that 
have a perceived relevance to particular medical genetic goals are preserved in the descriptive 
function of the gene symbol. KIR gene names encode information relevant to the molecular 
structures they produce, while CYP allele names differentiate between the clinical effects the 
variants have on drug metabolism. 
 The performative act of naming is famously tethered to institutions and institutional 
avatars that have been authorized to carry out such socially meaningful transformations 
(Althusser, 1971; Austin, 1975). ‘To understand biomedicine is to understand its regulation’, as 
Keating and Cambrosio (2003: 334) have put it. This, however, only further highlights the 
disunity within the process of translating scientific knowledge into clinical action. The right to 
‘baptize’ a given gene name is a function of ‘the sociolinguistic division of labor’ (Silverstein, 
2006; see also Putnam, 1975). The social legitimation of the Human Genome Organisation, for 
instance, only extends so far. General knowledge is not considered sufficient within the subfields 
of specialists, who constitute their own communities, with their own local gatekeepers authorized 
to officiate the entry of ‘dialectal’ words into niche nomenclatures. In this way, the history of 
gene nomenclatures is characteristic of broader trends in medical language. The clinic exists at 
the intersection of multiple speech communities, each with its own norms, and this causes even 
highly rationalistic scientific jargon to admit certain norms from other social groups (e.g., Hogan, 
2016; Jutel, 2011). 
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It has not been my intention to suggest that researchers across bioclinical collectives vary 
in their ontological conceptions of what constitutes a gene at the molecular level. Disagreement 
is not over what comprises the essential or ‘necessary’ (Putnam, 1975) features of the object, but 
over the features salient to its sub-classification. In this way, my argument differs from those of 
many philosophers of science, who describe paradigmatic conflicts between multiple ontological 
conceptions of ‘the Gene’ (see Kitcher, 1982, and citations therein). I hope to have demonstrated 
that a gene in medical genetics is much more than simply its nucleotide sequence. The 
information gleaned from a genetic test couples with the collective knowledge available to link it 
with a disease state. This provides an overabundance of potential characteristics to be encoded in 
the gene’s official symbol. It is the variability in the ascription of social value to particular 
characteristics and the erasure of others that constitute the disunity in the conceptualization of 
‘the Gene’, which in turn prevents general standardization.  
 
Coda 
There are two major constraints on standardization in genetic nomenclature: the force of 
historical inertia, which promotes legacy nomenclatures; and specialization, which selects 
divergent aspects of ‘the Gene’ for representation in its official symbols. The former of these 
difficulties persists because of standardization’s limited reach across speech communities: 
physician generations, disciplinary silos, laboratory and geographic insularity, etc. The latter of 
these difficulties persists, I have argued, because of a fundamental disunity in the conception and 
use of ‘the Gene’ as a socially meaningful object of medical and scientific intervention. The 
diversity of genes’ products and functions leads to an irreducible plurality of potential 
classifications and descriptions, and thus of names. This map–territory conundrum forces 
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researchers to ‘make assumptions about when and whether such variability is medically relevant’ 
(Timmermans and Epstein, 2010: 37). In cases such as the CYP genes, the two forces interact, 
with historical waves of preference for particular methods of classification getting concatenated 
within a single, unsystematized standard. 
As classificatory names, gene symbols attempt to capture enough salient descriptive 
information to be useful within the context of medical genetics. Yet they must simultaneously 
attempt to be general or generalizable enough to be able to represent every stretch of genetic 
variation that can be objectified as a socially recognizable scientific object.8F9 In this way, we can 
draw informative parallels to what Gal (2006) describes as the ‘contradiction’ implicit in 
standardizing national languages: the pretention to being simultaneously authentic to an object’s 
‘valuable, idiosyncratic properties’ (p. 166) and universal (or ‘general’ as I have said here) in 
terms of the system’s neutral and unconditional applicability. Again in somewhat parallel fashion 
to Gal’s case, this ‘contradiction’ is suppressed through a play of scale. The ideological drive for 
standardization ends up creating numerous spin-off, niche standards that specialists develop for 
individual genes or gene families. This heterogeneity of nomenclatures was the primordial state 
of genetic science and persists in contemporary medical genetics, which at its core 
conceptualizes itself as a constantly emerging and evolving practice. 
Nearly every update to the official, general standard for human gene nomenclatures 
includes a discussion about the future of genetics, scientific development and the constantly 
shifting nature of the objects to which its symbols are meant to refer. Even as these updates 
promote and lay down guidelines for a particular, uniform standard, they underscore the 
tenuousness of such a project. Just as ‘[a]ll pathology is subjective with regard to tomorrow’ 
(Canguilhem 1978[1966]: 125), so too is its classification. In fact, in the most recent iteration of 
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the guidelines for pharmacogenetic nomenclature (Kalman et al., 2016), the authors propose the 
replacement of the contemporary ‘star allele’ system with a new, more universal system that 
applies to allelic variation in all gene families, overseen by a superordinate committee. Even here, 
Kalman and her coauthors note that the new system might be ‘tedious or hard to understand’ for 
researchers who have come of professional age with the star nomenclature system (Kalman et al., 
2016: 18) and they therefore recommend the use of legacy nomenclature – ’familiar or 
alternative names’ (p. 12) – alongside the new standard.  
The new guidelines begin with a call to be prepared for change: ontological change and 
epistemological change, and, thus, linguistic change as well. For them, what makes the science 
behind gene naming scientific in the first place is that it is always changing. Today’s standard 
always implicitly holds within itself the potential to become tomorrow’s legacy. 
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Figure 1. Two KIR receptors.  
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Figure 2. Four genes within the CYP superfamily, and three allelic variants of one of those genes.  
 
Notes                                                         
1 NLRP3 is a name more general than CIAS1 and stands for NLR (a family of genes, all of which 
having a nucleotide-binding domain that produces protein segments called leucine-rich repeats) 
and pyrin-like protein (the downstream product of the gene). It is not the purpose of this article to 
explain what any of this means, but an interested reader may turn to Jha and Ting (2009) for 
further information. 
2 APOE (which encodes apolipoprotein E) is linked most prominently to Alzheimer disease, 
BRCA to breast cancer, and HOX genes (a type of homeobox gene) are involved in embryo 
development. 
3 The relationship between human and animal gene nomenclatures is interesting in its own right 
– and with serious implications for medical questions of disease modeling and ontological 
questions of homology – but it is too complex and too far afield to discuss here. 
4 HLA gene symbols are one of only three subsystems that are allowed to use punctuation in their 
gene symbols (for reasons of historical inertia, see Wain et al., 2002). 
5 The HLA system is not unique in this regard, though its history is particularly well documented. 
Another example is the chemokine lymphotactin gene (related to inflammation and 
immunological response), which was reported nearly simultaneously in 1995 by independent 
laboratories on three different continents. The gene quickly amassed multiple different local 
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symbols – ATAC, LTN, LPTN, and SCM1 – before the HGNC could agree on a (completely 
unrelated) official name (XCL1) many years later (Tamames and Valencia, 2006). 
6 The ‘I’ in this name originally stood for ‘inhibitory’ rather than ‘immunoglobulin-like’.  
7 It is worth noting that the HLA and KIR systems do not merely have biochemical traits in 
common. Some researchers have been key personnel in the efforts to standardize the 
nomenclature systems of both groups as well. The geneticist Steven GE Marsh, for instance, has 
been first author on a number of publications pertaining to both immunological gene families. 
8 Like many symbols, once an author has established what gene family is being discussed – by 
initially using the full gene symbol – the root can be elided, with only the gene-specific portion 
of the symbol being used. For example, KIR3DP1 may be abbreviated as 3DP1, as in ‘The 
KIR2DP1 and 3DP1 … pseudogenes’ (Rajalingam, 2012: 400). 
9 As with the case of HLA genes, genetic variation may ultimately be seen as a ‘continuum’ 
(Marsh et al., 2010: 294), but it is nonetheless made discrete through naming. 
